

POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES  
THE CASE OF SOUTH BALTIMORE

Zlatko Barovic  
Senior Fellow

Institute for Policy Studies  
Johns Hopkins University  
Baltimore  
1990

## CONTENTS

### Introduction

- I. City vs. Region: Chronology of Events in the Post-war America
  - A. The Decline of a Central City
  - B. The Extrapolated Phase of Rebuilding Inner Cities
  - C. New-old Activities for the Downtown
- II. City Morphology under the Conditions of Postindustrialism
- III. The Case of South Baltimore
  - A. The Context of the City
    - 1. Recent Development
    - 2. Development Plan
  - B. South Baltimore Area
    - 1. General Observations
    - 2. Analyses
    - 3. Program Definition
    - 4. Implementation plan

POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES  
THE CASE OF SOUTH BALTIMORE

A Preliminary Report

June, 1990

## CONTENTS

Introduction.....	1
I. City vs. Region: Chronology of Events in the Post-war America.....	2
A. The Decline of a Central City.....	2
B. The Extrapolated Phase of Rebuilding Inner Cities.....	4
C. New-old Activities for the Downtown.....	6
II. City Morphology under the Conditions of Postindustrialism.....	8
III. The Case of South Baltimore.....	11
A. The Context of the City.....	11
1. Recent Development.....	11
2. Development Plan.....	15
B. South Baltimore Area-General Observations.....	22
References.....	26

## INTRODUCTION

Present stage of city development in the United States usually does not enable a comprehensive research and examination of the overall city development and improvement. Strong private sector very often determines lines of action so that public policy, instead of imposing and leading future development, has to be satisfied by trying to attract future investment and , at the same time, achieve balance and guidance of different initiatives. Planning strategies are, therefore, designed to act in an incremental way, by examining and resolving each case separately. At the same time the actual shift from industrial to postindustrial city requires a stronger role of policy leadership in the city. In terms of planning it could be achieved by introducing more coordination of different projects within an area, if not possible on the level of the entire city.

South Baltimore represents a substantially sufficient part of Baltimore in terms of expressing city's present difficulties in transition from one of the most important industrial cities in the country to services oriented contemporary postindustrial city. Located south of the downtown area and bordering several important and big future projects of the city, as well as former industrial and presently blighted areas, it embraces almost all current planning issues. Through analyses of the area this paper will try to deal with these issues aiming at defining a program and implementation plan for future development as a model of planning strategy within a postindustrial city. In order to do so historical preconditions and the stage of postindustrialism will be briefly examined and than related to the South Baltimore area.

## I. CITY VS. REGION: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE POST-WAR AMERICA

Present situation in American cities is a phase in the set of events which started to reshape the traditional relationship between the city and the region after the Second World War. A somewhat absurd struggle and a competition between the two manifests an extreme decentralization of the political system which curtails the degree of planning control making it hardly feasible. In order to achieve a better understanding of the present condition it is useful to review its preceding account.

### A. THE DECLINE OF A CENTRAL CITY

A thoroughly discussed process of invading and inhabiting outer cities' areas or the phenomenon of suburban sprawl in early 50's has manifold explanations. While accepting the most vivid and practical explanation of home loans or federally insured mortgages which helped meeting the pent-up hunger for new homes and their logical allocation at less expansive suburban areas<sup>1</sup>, it is beneficial not to forget elements traditionally rooted in the foundations of American society. At the level of typology it is the individual house, which, as Vincent Scully puts it, was "the integration of garden and woodland, street and savannah" and "the first perhaps the most beautiful of all those several synthesis of Europe and America"<sup>2</sup>, while the category of township, based on English manor system, may explain it as a regional concept.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Frieden, B. J., Sagalyn, L. B. (1989): Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities, Cambridge, The MIT Press, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Scully, V. (1969): American Architecture and Urbanism, New York, Praeger.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Mumford, L. (1961): The City in History, New York, Harcourt.

The system of townships, established in 1785 by the Land Ordinance, also produced a gridiron system, a major landscape feature in America frequently cited as both a manifestation of democratic and egalitarian system but also of highly speculative intentions made possible by its simplicity and efficiency.

Cf. Carter, H. (1983): An Introduction to Urban Historical Geography, Baltimore, Arnold.

In fact, a suburban house was, besides a gridiron city, one of two basic physical manifestations of early Puritan and generally protestant spirit in America. It was a materialization of the Jeffersonian ideal of America's dream and belief in the common man, a tradition still very strong in America.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, cultural preferences and inclination to a certain policy or regional model were heavily supported by a new industry of merchant builders which was organized to meet the increased demand.<sup>5</sup> Cheap fuel, inexpensive cars and highway construction, an element which, together with the electrification of tramway in 1890's and 1900's, started the urban sprawl in both Europe and America, now became an even more dominant component for creating new suburbia.<sup>6</sup>

In this way the federal support or public initiative, which aimed at assisting people's needs for homeownership, also paved way for a huge private investment and profit. The final consequence was strengthening the private sector through building large areas outside cities on one hand, and a decline of central city together with decreasing tax revenues and weakening the power base of the city government. According to statistics the share of downtown areas in cities' budgets dropped for 25% from 1948 to 1954 in 13 of the largest metropolitan areas.<sup>7</sup> Because of a highly decentralized system and inability to distribute revenues on the level of the state or, at least township, this situation heavily afflicted inner city's areas. The whole history of subsequent events in American cities, therefore, exemplifies the effort of establishing sound foundations for rebuilding cities by a joint public and private investment which very often, because of lack of adequate apparatus, fails to be beneficiary for general public and proceeds in further fortification of private capital.

---

<sup>4</sup> In 1960 62% of population had home ownership.

Source: Beyer, G. H. (1965): Housing and Society, New York, Macmillan.

<sup>5</sup> In the 1930's they were providing 300.000 homes a year, in 1946 it has raised to one million and by 1950 to two million homes.

Source: Frieden (1989), op. cit., p.11.

<sup>6</sup> "The first devil in the deterioration piece was the automobile. It came upon us after World War II. ...In all of this we were drawing life out of the center city, and doing nothing to help the center city accommodate to this new demand for moving about.

At the same time, there arose the American Dream for a way to live- a quarter-acre lot, picket fence, station wagon, golf course, outdoor barbecue- these became the picture of the good American life."

Source: Rouse, J. W.: The Case for Vision, in Porter, P. R., Sweet, D. C. ed.(1984): Rebuilding America's Cities: Roads to Recovery, Rutgers, Center for Urban Policy and Research, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

## B. THE EXTRAPOLATED PHASE OF REBUILDING INNER CITIES

The first significant attempt to rebuild American cities, which came in the 1950's, or so called Eisenhower years, was based on the ideology of modern town planning, a movement whose ideas started to be widely implemented in that period all over the world. The basic theoretical document for such a development, the Charter of Athens<sup>8</sup>, was, as almost everywhere else, partly misunderstood and misused which resulted in an effort to build new urban or street patterns with a little regard for preserving traditional character of cities both in terms of morphology and social concern. Revolutionary Corbusian ideas of changing society were combined with private investments and speculation hidden under the protection of federal initiative to rebuild cities. The result was a huge construction of new highways and private projects in artificially created blighted areas, or falsely interpreted as such, using significant amounts of federal grants for improving residential areas:

"The Housing Act of 1954 allowed 10% of federal grants to be used for nonresidential projects as long as there were a substantial number of substandard houses in the area... (but) later the Congress raised exceptions to 35% in 1965, and without requirements for substantial houses."<sup>9</sup>

In this way the attempt to rebuild cities, together with the allocation of significant amounts of federal and state resources, resulted in gaining further profit for the private sector and even more extensive demolition of the downtown areas.

Because of overlapping of interests and clear resources of political power, this process was, in fact, frequently practiced by city officials and renewal chiefs, also with little regard for existing urban and social fabric. The bill was often paid by poor and, therefore, uninfluential segments of the society:

"Backed by influential coalitions, reinforced by expert judgement that downtown was obsolete, given the power of government to take private property and the budgets of two federal programs to pay for it, ambitious renewal chiefs were soon pulling down buildings by the hundreds in the hearts of cities. Where developers normally had to negotiate for years to fit together building sites out of the dozens of small parcels that made up every city block, renewal agencies could clear huge tracts in one stroke.

...

By the late 1950's urban renewal and interstate highways were converging on neighborhoods near the center of cities, uprooting families by the thousands. Moving was a burden for those who lived in the way of renewal and highway projects. Most were black or Hispanic, and most were poor. Of all the families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was known were nonwhite, and of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of whites had incomes low enough to qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom

---

<sup>8</sup> Sert, J. L. and C. I. A. M. (1947): Can Our Cities Survive?, Cambridge, The Harvard Univ. Press, pp. 246-249: The Town-planning Chart: Fourth C. I. A. M. Congress, Athens, 1933.

<sup>9</sup> Frieden, op. cit., p. 24.



available to them."<sup>10</sup>

This was especially true in the case of Baltimore, where the houses of 10.000 families, 90% of them black, were bulldozed. Baltimore was also, together with cities undergoing major downtown renewal programs, such as San Francisco, Atlanta and Boston, a place where this program was followed by a huge office construction with a significant increase in the 1960's.<sup>11</sup>

Baltimore's 33 acre Charles Center was one of the most known such projects with plans to build it starting in the late 1950's under the coalition of leading businessmen and government politicians.<sup>12</sup>

However, this great construction activity in American cities was not followed by the appreciation of general public. Office construction alone lacked attractiveness and, since developers were put aside of these projects, new suburban malls started to flourish. Renewed central business districts comprised only economic function, which is only one of functions, besides social and cultural, that leads to the city's marketplace.<sup>13</sup> Starting with Southdale on the outskirts of Minneapolis in 1956, as a first one with a "year round comfortable shopping", by the early 1970's suburban shopping malls had become new community centers.<sup>14</sup>

In this way the relationship between inner cities and suburban development remained the same as before renewal processes, only with further invasion and occupancy of suburban land.

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 27-28.

<sup>11</sup> Frieden, op. cit., p. 56-57.

<sup>12</sup> "During the transition from the 1950's to the 1960's, the Charles Street Association, comprised of 100 businessmen on that street, began an ambitious campaign to dress up their area. Their plans included brightly colored awnings, flower boxes, benches, off-street parks, and new facades on the five blocks of Charles Street between Baltimore and Center Streets. At the same time plans were drawn up for a new civic center building. It was to be the heart of the revitalized inner city. Finally, plans for a new high-rise office building complex were made public. The Charles Center was to anchor a dynamic new Baltimore in the making. It was to be a project which joined business and government in a unique partnership geared toward the city's salvation"

Source: Friedrichs, J., Goodman, A. C.(1987): The Changing Downtown: A Comparative Study of Baltimore and Hamburg, Berlin, de Gruyter, p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Friedrichs, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Frieden, op. cit., p. 68.

### C. NEW-OLD ACTIVITIES FOR THE DOWNTOWN

New activities for downtown areas started both with a certain saturation of the regional scale and a necessity for retail and commercial activities accompanying renewal projects. In terms of urban theory they were followed by growing critique on failures of modern town planning and an effort for recognition of spontaneous social processes and popular aims. Frequently cited work from that period was J. Jacobs's on unslumming processes and Venturi's populist approach based on pop-culture movement in the United States.<sup>15</sup>

Some smaller scale projects, such as Cannery and Ghirardelli Square, both in San Francisco, already proved successful in aiming at knitting into the existing city fabric and introducing a variety of retail and leisure activities in an obsolete and blighted structure or area.<sup>16</sup> Those attempts paved way to new large scale construction in downtown areas but this time cities are animating developers to build in downtown, because they need their help in a situation where they have rigid building codes compared to suburban areas. This time it was not the bureaucratic elite that conducted the development but rather developers by themselves, only backed up from the city hall. They were choosing small strategic and prominent sites for crowd-pulling shopping malls with a lot of help in terms of public money.<sup>17</sup> Finally this cooperation led into attempts of solving public problems with private money, which was a big idea in the 1970's.<sup>18</sup>

As it was frequently happening before, private investment, in order to protect its interests, took over the whole set of events to its benefits, gaining profits from relatively small areas and neglecting adjacent ones. The case of Baltimore is a good example of this process because only 3,2 acres of waterfront land were added

---

<sup>15</sup> Jacobs, J.(1961): The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York, Vintage.

Venturi, R., Scott Brown, D., Izenour, S.(1977): Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, Cambridge, The MIT Press.

<sup>16</sup> Robert Stern talks about exclusive vs. inclusive philosophies in dealing with existing city fabric.

Cf. Stern, R.A.M.(1969): New Directions in American Architecture, New York, Braziller.

<sup>17</sup> "Land costs were another obstacle: even with urban renewal writedowns, some developers saw no way to compete with the suburbs on rent. ...Leasing was slow and they had to make rent concessions.

With so many trouble spots, cities had to work hard to interest developers. In San Bernardino the city built the two-level air-conditioned pedestrian mall and parking facilities in order to bring in a potential developer to provide the stores. Although this initiative was probably necessary, building the core of the mall in advance added extra costs and management problems for the mall shops and public spaces."

Source: Frieden, op. cit., p. 85.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 215.

to former 33-acre Charles Center enabling tremendous profits for developers.<sup>19</sup>

First two pavilions were followed by a number of other activities, namely The Maryland Science Center, The Aquarium, a marina, The World Trade Center, The Gallery and a recently expanded convention center accompanied by several luxurious hotels. Two new stadiums will be added to the site, together with the Christofor Columbus Maritime Center as an attempt to further capitalize on the existing core. Although the whole enterprise has been envisioned and declared as a beginning for further development and renewal in the downtown area, it lacks facilities for satisfying basic every-days needs by itself, not to speak about the surrounding area. This fact has also been recognized by the new director of the Baltimore Planning Department, mr. Ernest Freeman, as a major planning problem.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> "As early as 1974 inner harbor plans were already being considered. In 1977 the Hyatt Hotel Organization put in its bid for construction of a \$35.000.000 luxury hotel adjacent to the inner harbor. In December of 1978 it became official. The city turned 3,1 acres of land over to Rouse Company for design and construction of two waterside pavilions. Then, in January of 1979, ground was broken for Harborplace."

Source: Friedrichs, op. cit. p. 21.

<sup>20</sup> Freeman, E.: Perspectives on Baltimore: Realities and Future Vision, University of Maryland Saturday Seminars, Baltimore, February 10, 1990.

## II. CITY MORPHOLOGY UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIALISM

When looking at American cities today, we can observe physical manifestations of ongoing development whose forces are, more or less, governed by postindustrial tendencies. The fragmentation of urban tissue is a result of strong private interests and investments, with a very loose public or governmental control over resources, in the situation when huge portions of inner cities, mainly industrial zones and port facilities, become obsolete due to the shift towards service activities.<sup>21</sup>

Having problems in achieving a balance between different interests and impossibility of gearing them to the common denominator, a postindustrial city, at the same time, has to function as an entity in order to compete with other cities worldwide. Contrary to the "private city" and laissez faire policy of the industrial period, contemporary postindustrial city asks for a collaboration of private investment and policy leadership or, to be more precise, for a clever political

---

<sup>21</sup> "The number of jobs in finance, insurance, and business and professional services jumped from 3 million in the mid-1950's to more than 11 million by the early 1980's. In addition, the growth of government and nonprofit agencies added to the demand for office space. Service jobs in total (counting government and nonprofit jobs) increased from 57% of U.S. employment in 1947 to 71 percent in 1982. Manufacturing meanwhile slipped from 32% to 22% of the total."

Source: Frieden, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

guidance of entrepreneurship.<sup>22</sup>

In order to be more competitive from the outside, the post-industrial city has to be less competitive on the inside.<sup>23</sup> What is needed for such a strategy is, obviously, a planning methodology of any kind, presently lacking in most cities going through a transitional phase towards postindustrialism.<sup>24</sup>

After a period of large scale development which provided cities with adequate revenues, or parallel to such developments, a more coordinated action, which will take into consideration broader spatial and social factors, has to take place. Otherwise, the achieved benefits, since the city is advertising itself as an entity, will be jeopardized. Even though the present development of retail and recreational space was enabled due to obsolete industrial sites, it was very often hostile to the surrounding area. At the same time bringing up of some of the neighborhoods sometimes meant further impoverishment of the others. At the level of the city it amplified the conflict and increased the inconsistency of the overall system. Even great developers, as James Rouse, understand the present condition when talking about renewal strategies.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, situation in blighted areas of the city is beyond superficial and cosmetic treatment, deserving and asking for a fundamental and inclusive action with an elaborated programme for gradual improvement.<sup>26</sup>

In terms of demography and social structure the problem of gentrification

---

<sup>22</sup> "The rise of post-industrialism changed urban politics, both in America and abroad. Political brokerage and monumentalism could no longer suffice. Energetic and imaginative policy leadership was required. ...The political signs pointed toward corporatism. The drift was gradual, in some cases incomplete, and it was not always susceptible to precise measurement. But the signs were unmistakable, and today they pervade the political mood of the post-industrial city."

Savitch, H.V.(1988): Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris and London, Princeton Univ. Press, p.285.

<sup>23</sup> "Great cities can no longer afford a free-wheeling, "build as one might" economy. To compete effectively, the post-industrial city needs to harness its internal resources. Politics becomes both the instrument and the exemplar of this effort."

Source: Savitch, op. cit., p. 285.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 287.

<sup>25</sup> "Big business is not what we should be seeking in economic development for the city. Eighty percent of all new jobs created in America in the last decade have been in businesses employing less than 100 people."

Source: Rouse, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>26</sup> "An interview with the president of one of Baltimore's major department stores suggests a continued weakness of downtown retailing. When asked, if downtown could ever again support the "flagship" operations, that used to line Howard Street (the traditional retail center), Angelo Arena replied:

"It's over for Baltimore. There are really very few downtowns across the country where the big flagships can be successful-which is not to say that there isn't a sizable market here. I think you'll see smaller locations, in order to cater to the young professionals who need a place to shop at lunchtime." (Cohen, 1985:14)."

became a hot issue in the early 1980's. The argument was that new "urban gentry" distorts the social picture of the city even more, despite, or because of, improvement of certain neighborhoods. Even though it was true for most of it, the fact is that it contributed to cities' recovery, on one hand, and the scale and implications of the movement were probably a little bit overemphasized. Contradictions of the whole movement are proven by a lot of arguments among researchers. Today, when statistical data could be better articulated and profoundly presented, gentrification, despite the damage it eventually did to some areas, appears to be a minor movement compared to the citywide social structure.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to this issue, it has occurred that the present movement to the city, in most cases, happens to be because of, either lack of suburban housing on the market, or higher prices in the suburb (latter probably being the consequence of former).<sup>28</sup> Having in mind also the demographic situation, with an increase of smaller households and a rising rate of young independent adults, separations and divorces,<sup>29</sup> the prognosis could be made that new urban "nongentry" residents, some of them moving from a rental apartment within the city, are in fact gradually improving and upgrading existing neighborhoods, instead of gentrifying them.<sup>30</sup>

Having in mind all these new trends when dealing with improvement of a city structure, we can conclude that the time has come for a more profound and comprehensive planning at least at the level of smaller city's areas, if not on the level of the entire city. Such a strategy should take into account all existing and various planning factors and combine them in a subtle way in order to accomplish gradual improvements in all segments of the plan. The present demographic situation, with diminishing dangers of gentrification, can only help in such efforts.

---

<sup>27</sup> "By 1977 almost all of the thirty largest cities had neighborhood reinvestment, but declining neighborhoods greatly outnumbered those enjoying a revival. Renovation was centered in some one hundred neighborhoods and involved less than one-half of 1 percent of the houses in these cities. An investigation of the changing racial makeup of census districts within three miles of downtown, as well as of neighborhoods known for gentrification, confirmed that the net effects were small."

Source: Frieden, op. cit., p. 272.

<sup>28</sup> "Housing construction, however, has clearly not kept pace with demand. The year 1982, for example, witnessed the lowest number of new housing starts in two decades. The slowdown in new suburban starts, in turn, has meant greater interest in existing residences. Some of the increased demand for existing city housing would thus have occurred even without any changes in lifestyle favoring city residence."

Source: Palen, J., London, B., ed.(1984): Gentrification, Displacement and Neighborhood Revitalization, Albany, State Univ. of New York Press, p. 258.

<sup>29</sup> During the 1970's there has been a 9 percent increase in persons but a 25 percent increase in number of households.

Source: Current Population Reports 1980, p.1.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Palen, op. cit., pp. 260-263.

### III. THE CASE OF SOUTH BALTIMORE

#### A. THE CONTEXT OF THE CITY

Being a very stabile and traditional area of Baltimore city, with typical pattern of row houses, South Baltimore area also adjoins Baltimore's CBD with its famous Inner Harbor development, and, in that way, faces major eventual extensions of that development in an effort to endlessly capitalize on existing core. In addition, South Baltimore area, by itself, has a nice and valuable view of the harbour at its disposal, also bordering the existing part of Inner Harbor development north of Federal Hill (Fig. 1). Future stadium construction, as part of the downtown extension, will or could have major influence on the predominantly residential area.

Trends of spontaneous shifting of the downtown activity to the south are already noticed in recent research on city development (fig. 2), and, in order to discuss South Baltimore's future prospectives, it is useful to briefly overview the citywide situation.

#### 1. RECENT DEVELOPMENT

Changes of the Baltimore's growth, or the city's downtown decline after the World War II, follow, more or less, the typical pattern of American cities, when the population decentralized, the major department stores closed their stores in the downtown area and opened new ones in the suburbs. While the metropolitan area significantly grew between 1960 and 1980 by approximately 20,5 percent, central city fell in population by 16,2 percent. Business employment, at the same time, fell by 12,0 percent.<sup>31</sup>

To have a more complete understanding of these trends, it is useful to go over more elaborated statistics (Tables I.; II.; III.), as indicators of one's utopic Wright's vision of the Broadacre City coming true.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> Friedrichs, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>32</sup> Wright, F. L.(1932): The Disappearing City, New York, Payson.



Fig. 1.: Location of South Baltimore Area within the City






Fig. 2.: Expansion and Contraction of the Baltimore Downtown Area 1967 and 1979.

Source: Friedrichs, op. cit., p. 52.

Table I.: Basic Characteristics of Baltimore, 1980.

	Area		Population
	sq. miles	hectares	
Central City	78	20,168	786,775
Beltway*	150	38,880	1,361,641
SMSA	2,259	584,087	2,174,000

Table II.: Population and Employment, 1960-1980.

		C.C.	Fringe	SMSA
Population (1,000)	1960	939	865	1,804
	1970	906	1,165	2,071
	1980	787	1,387	2,174
Pct. Chge.	1960-80	-16.2	+60.3	+20.5
Employment* (1,000)	1959/61	342	147	489
	1970	367	238	605
	1980/81	301	398	699
Pct. Chge.	1961-80	-12.0	+170.8	+42.9

Table III.: Selected Indicators for Retail, 1967-1979.

		CBD	C.C.	SMSA
Sales*** (Mill. \$/DM)	1967	207	1,477	2,944
	1978	112	1,165	3,888
	Pct. Change	-45.9	-21.1	+32.1
Stores	1968	572	7,575	13,563
	1979	491	5,474	14,203
	Pct. Change	-14.2	-27.7	+4.7
Employment	1968	12,590	56,392	103,502
	1977/79	7,375	43,692	130,785
	Pct. Change	-41.4	-22.5	+26.4

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census 1967, 1977; FHH, StaLa, 1972d; 214:  
FHH, StaLa, 1982: 172, in Friedrichs, op. cit., p. 10.

The success of the Charles Center and the Harborplace is clearly manifesting the necessary change of land use in downtown area but it also shows that even such big projects cannot improve or change the overall trend. The only thing they did was decreasing the rate of decline in the period from 1977 to 1982.<sup>33</sup>

The common argument that it is not practical to have manufacturers in the town, especially having in addition the problem of obsolete industries, was expressed as early as 1962 by economist Raymond Vernon. In his New York Metropolitan Region Study he also defined the group of firms which needed downtown location as those with a face-to-face character of practice, such as lawyers, bankers, corporate officers etc.<sup>34</sup>

Following precisely those arguments Baltimore has developed its downtown area in the way and with all the features already explained and listed. As a strategy and a way of thinking it was a real flagship operation enabled by available blighted land in the core of the city, and also by substantial amounts of abandoned housing stock. Affordable land, together with all in all positive goals of rehabilitating and recapturing city's vitality, enabled large scale housing programmes, which helped getting away with accompanying dispossession of adjacent, and bigger, residing areas.<sup>35</sup>

As growing and improving the image of the city, this development probably came to the point of exhausting its potentials, when such an action, maybe necessary in the beginning, has to be accompanied with broader strategies. Obvious example is inability to proceed with the housing strategy both because of running out of bigger amounts of deteriorated houses and escalating prices due to overall service improvement of the area.<sup>36</sup>

## 2. DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Predicting a future for a city as Baltimore, under the complex and challenging conditions of a shift towards postindustrialism, is certainly not a very gratifying business. Even though a serious research has been made on issues of the city's future, the conclusions were drawn in very broad way. General study on Baltimore's economy and future goals, done by Peter Szanton, also brings up the issue of disbalance between the Inner Harbor development and the shape of city's

---

<sup>33</sup> Friedrichs, op. cit., p. 227.

<sup>34</sup> "These communication-oriented firms employed perhaps one-fifth of an urban area's labor force and formed the critical downtown concentration most likely to resist the lure of the suburbs."

Source: Frieden, op. cit., p. 263.

<sup>35</sup> "In Baltimore in last seven years, there have been over 7.000 houses rehabilitated and restored within ten minutes of downtown. This is happening all over the country-wherever the opportunity is created. Baltimore's city government created that opportunity with a homesteading program that made badly deteriorated housing available for \$1 on the condition that it be brought up to prescribed standards. As the houses in the homestead areas were renovated, they brought new life to adjacent rundown houses."

Source: Rouse, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Ibid., p. 24.

neighborhoods.<sup>37</sup> When looking at tables and diagrams he is presenting, the renewal achievement in the downtown area starts fading. The first indicator are population trends: they clearly point at the range of polarization in the city (Fig. 3). The shift within the structure is due primarily to a massive white out-migration, and not to black population growth. In addition, the composition of those that moved was disproportionally affluent and, correspondingly, the city's percentage of people below the poverty line was almost twice as big as the one of the region. The result is that city's revenues are not adequate to sustain this situation, taxes are increasing, and, consequently, a significant portion of the middle class has been squeezed out of the city, contributing to further polarization. It can be clearly seen by comparing the city's and region's median incomes (Fig. 4) and declining number of jobs (Fig. 5). Professional services were the only ones that expanded, and almost everything else contracted, with emphases on manufacturing jobs: from 1,513 manufacturing establishments in 1960 to 696 in 1984. This situation deserves a very careful conduct of the remaining manufacturing business, a problem which also affected South Baltimore area by the issue of former Bethlehem Steel shipyard.<sup>38</sup>

Despite optimistic tunes of a promising city for business,<sup>39</sup> a comparative projected percentage of growth in population and income, as well as projected household incomes, do not look very good for Baltimore (Fig. 6,7).

Further shift in job's structure could be seen at a projection of employment by major sectors (Table IV). The overall growth will be very moderate, manufacturing continues to decline, additional jobs are seen only in services, transportation, communication and public utilities. The most interesting fact is that, Baltimore's success in the Inner Harbor area, retail sales will continue to fall because the real income of the residents decline.

---

<sup>37</sup> In the preface of his research study Szanton is quoting "a prominent Baltimorean":

"For the last fifteen years it's been pretty clear where the city was headed and who was going to get it there. None of that is clear now. Maybe by the year 2000 Baltimore will have done for its neighborhoods what it's done for the inner harbor and downtown. It could be a much bigger success story than it is now. But it's also possible that by then the city will have been gutted-industry gone to Korea and Brazil, port traffic to Norfolk and white collar jobs to the counties, Delaware, the Washington suburbs."

Source: Szanton, P.L.(1986): Baltimore 2000: A Choice of Futures, Report to the Morris Goldseker Foundation.

<sup>38</sup> Former shipyard has been purchased by developer Richard Swirnow in order to regenerate it. The project, presently known as Harborview, soon turned into a huge residential development counting on attractive view of the harbour.

Source: Rosenthal, D.: The Pit Bull of Harborview, Maryland Business Weekly, May 15, 1990.

<sup>39</sup> Baltimore is rated 5th in the top ten American cities to do business.

Labich, K.: The Best Cities for Business, FORTUNE, October 23, 1989.

■ Total Population  
■ Black Population




Fig. 3.: Baltimore Population Trends, 1960-1985 (in Hundred Thousands).  
Source: Szanton, op. cit., p. 2.




Fig. 4.: Median Incomes, 1985: Baltimore vs. The Counties  
Source: Szanton, op. cit., p. 3.




Fig. 5.: Jobs in Baltimore, 1960-1985 (in Hundred Thousands).  
Source: Szanton, op. cit., p. 5.




Fig. 6.: Projected Percentage Growth in Selected Regions;  
 A. Population  
 B. Income  
 Source: Szanton, op. cit., p. 14.




Fig. 7.: Household Incomes, 1980-2000 (in Constant Thousand Dollars).  
 Source: Szanton, op. cit., p. 15.

Table IV.: Employment by Major Sectors, Baltimore City.  
Source: Szanton, op. cit., p. 19.

	<i>NUMBER OF JOBS (000's)</i>			
	<u>1985</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>2000</u>
ALL SECTORS TOTAL	420.9	423.9	424.9	425.8
CONSTRUCTION	13.6	14.0	13.6	13.9
MANUFACTURING	52.2	47.1	43.1	39.9
NON-DURABLE GOODS	32.9	30.0	27.1	24.0
DURABLE GOODS	14.3	17.1	16.6	15.9
TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION & PUBLIC UTILITIES	25.9	30.9	32.8	33.2
TRADE	79.5	79.1	78.1	78.4
FINANCE, INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE	35.2	35.6	35.3	34.7
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES	59.9	61.3	64.2	66.8
OTHER SERVICES	38.6	40.1	41.1	42.6
GOVERNMENT	86.9	86.4	83.8	83.1

More practical and precise future planning goals and activities for the city are listed in the Overall Economic Development Program Report, in the chapter called New Potentials for Economic Development.<sup>40</sup> According to that report, the greatest potential is in the following areas:

- \* biomedical industry
- \* tourism
- \* new enterprise development
- \* business retention and protection
- \* new business park development
- \* downtown office marketing
- \* commercial revitalization
- \* general economic planning

As seen above, main activities are targeted towards bigger business and larger scale development, even though all major issues are listed. Maintaining stability among the inhabitants and within the neighborhoods, as part of a long run strategy is only indirectly mentioned through some of the areas. They can be found in programmes such as Small Business Development Center and Program (as part of "new enterprise development" category), "industrial protection zones"; commercial strips revitalization, the City's minority business contract law etc.

A more neighborhoods oriented strategy is seen in future housing policies. The main goals are, as follows:

- \* provision of decent, affordable housing for low and moderate income families (it contributes to a stable work force).
- \* retention and attraction of middle and upper middle income households

---

<sup>40</sup> Overall Economic Development Program Report, July, 1988, BEDCO, pp.38-55.

(contributes to the tax base and spending power).

\* reduction of blight and vacant housing (contributes to the image of the city as a good place for business).<sup>41</sup>

In order to achieve some of these goals, the city has developed several programs, such as;

1. Neighborhood Development Bank, which is designed to assist in financing housing redevelopment programs, especially those undertaken by community development corporations.
2. "Building Blocks" Program, which takes vacant houses and renovates them to a minimum level and then sells them-a strategy to stabilize declining areas.
3. Qualified Redevelopment Areas (QRA's), which allow the use of tax free bonds to support private redevelopment activity.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Overall Economic Development Program Report, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 52-53.



## B. SOUTH BALTIMORE AREA: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

At this point The South Baltimore area is a very stabile traditionally built part of Baltimore which also came through an exceptionally successful renewal process in the past (Fig. 8). It is surrounded by several big either existent or planned developments (Fig. 9).

Spring Garden Baltimore Gas & Electric Plant (# 4) has been already integrated into a broader neighborhood context both in terms of functional and visual aspects. Being a landmark on a gateway to the city, it is also one of important industrial employers in the city. Southern part of the area is reserved for a new Port Covington industrial park (# 3). Apart from a questionable site for such an activity (the city is taking a potentially attractive waterfront site in order to compete with suburban industrial parks), this location is also physically secluded and separated from the residential area by Route 95 and, therefore, does not have direct implications for the adjacent South Baltimore area.

The two projects with major implications though, are Camden Yards Sports Complex (# 1) and Harborview Project (# 2). The first one is an attempt to further expand the downtown activity and also capitalize a little bit more on existing Inner Harbor features in terms of a mutual and overlapping usage of space. The second one is "the biggest residential project ever planned in Baltimore-one with as many residences as Mount Washington or Bolton Hill".<sup>43</sup> While the argument of a completion of the downtown offer could maybe stand in the case of the Sports Complex, which, although situated in the core of the city, has a very good regional transportation connections and access to the site, it is hard to justify the huge Harborview project, both in terms of planning and a townscape. This future development demonstrates a constant town-planning problem of a concentration of residential and office space on edges of a city core in an effort for its endless extension. Aside of traffic congestion problems (on daily bases, contrary to the stadiums's occasional events), it has already been proven in the theory of town-planning that accumulating central functions

---

<sup>43</sup> Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 12.




Fig. 8.: Slum and Blighted Areas in Baltimore before the Postwar Renewal Project.

Source: Urban Renewal in Baltimore, Planning Commission of Baltimore, 1954, p. 29.




Fig. 9.: South Baltimore Residential Area with Adjacent Projects:

1. Camden Yards Sports Complex
2. Harborview/Key Highway Area
3. Port Covington
4. Spring Garden Baltimore Gas & Electric Plant

does not extend downtown's gravity in the same proportion, and that, after a certain point, the attractiveness of the downtown area does not rise with density of central functions. It further means that a downtown area in question could be over-used while lacking central functions citywide.<sup>44</sup> In terms of a townscape and city's identity this project dramatically changes the traditional picture despite the accepted fact that a future development must think of city's context at least in terms of reminiscence if not of literary repeating found functions and conditions. If we had not been aware of land speculation and not enough powerful governmental apparatus, due to strong private sector, we could also speak about the old "horror vacui" syndrome.

The doubts expressed above could stand by themselves, independently of the context of the surrounding area. If we try to relate them to the problems of immediate community, aside from the already questioned issue of large scale development at this stage of Baltimore's development, and their inability to change the overall trend of a decline, they will inevitably extend. While the threat on the existing community is quite serious in terms of future social, demographic, economic and physical change, the issue is how to gain both benefits and ensure protection for existing jobs and activities. Local business, especially the most developed part around Cross Street Market is additionally threatened by a new shopping mall in the southeast part of the area.

In order to find solutions it is necessary to put all the implications and elements of different plans, as well as those for the area, into a comprehensive structural relationship which would enable future guidelines for the site. First step is an extensive quantitative data analysis followed by spatial and functional analysis. This stage could provide the elements for a programme and development plan. The possibilities for the narrow part of Key Highway Study Area, owned by the city (west of Key Highway), should be examined and planned in detail, due to their potential use in terms of resolving neighborhood problems.

---

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Cukovic, M.(1985): City Centers, Ph. D. Thesis, Faculty of Architecture, University of Zagreb.

## REFERENCES

1. Beyer, G. H. (1965): Housing and Society, New York, Macmillian.
2. Carter, H. (1983): An Introduction to Urban Historical Geography, Baltimore, Arnold.
3. Freeman, E.: Perspectives on Baltimore: Realities and Future Vision, University of Maryland Saturday Seminars, Baltimore, February 10, 1990.
4. Frieden, B. J., Sagalyn, L. B. (1989): Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities, Cambridge, The MIT Press, p. 11.
5. Friedrichs, J., Goodman, A. C. (1987): The Changing Downtown: A Comparative Study of Baltimore and Hamburg, Berlin, de Gruyter, p. 20.
6. Jacobs, J. (1961): The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York, Vintage.
7. Labich, K.: The Best Cities for Business, FORTUNE, October 23, 1989.
8. Mumford, L. (1961): The City in History, New York, Harcourt.
9. Overall Economic Development Program Report, July, 1988, BEDCO.
10. Palen, J., London, B., ed. (1984): Gentrification, Displacement and Neighborhood Revitalization, Albany, State Univ. of New York Press, p. 258.
11. Porter, P. R., Sweet, D. C. ed. (1984): Rebuilding America's Cities: Roads to Recovery, Rutgers, Center for Urban Policy and Research.
12. Rosenthal, D.: The Pit Bull of Harborview, Maryland Business Weekly, May 15, 1990.
13. Rouse, J. W.: The Case for Vision, in Porter, P. R., Sweet, D. C. ed. (1984): Rebuilding America's Cities: Roads to Recovery, Rutgers, Center for Urban Policy and Research.

14. Savitch, H.V.(1988): Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris and London, Princeton Univ. Press, p.285.
15. Scully, V. (1969): American Architecture and Urbanism, New York, Praeger.
16. Sert, J. L. and C. I. A. M. (1947): Can Our Cities Survive?, Cambridge, The Harvard Univ. Press, pp. 246-249: The Town-planning Chart: Fourth C. I. A. M. Congress, Athens, 1933.
17. Stern, R.A.M.(1969): New Directions in American Architecture, New York, Braziller.
18. Szanton, P.L.(1986): Baltimore 2000: A Choice of Futures, Report to the Morris Goldseker Foundation.
19. Urban Renewal in Baltimore, Planning Commission of Baltimore, 1954.
20. Venturi, R., Scott Brown, D., Izenour, S.(1977): Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
21. Wright, F. L.(1932): The Disappearing City, New York, Payson.